| Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Foster
| |
| | that (1) they are suffering from an
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| No. 2007 MAP 2003 (December 30, 2005)
| |
| | objectively verifiable physical injury,
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| Holding: An insurer may deny uninsured
| |
| | and (2) the injury arose in the course of
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| motorist benefits to an insured claimant
| |
| | employment and was related thereto.
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| who fails to report the accident to the
| |
| | Justice Saylor filed a concurring
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| police or other governmental authority as
| |
| | opinion, and Justice Newman filed a
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| required by the policy and the Motor
| |
| | dissenting opinion.
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| Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75
| |
| | ►Supersedeas Fund Reimbursement
|
| Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7. Justice Saylor
| |
| | ♦ Comm., Dept. of Labor & Industry
|
| filed a concurring opinion, concluding
| |
| | v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
|
| that regardless of the language of the
| |
| | (Exel Logistics) No. 37 WAP 2004
|
| MVFRL, a carrier may include a police
| |
| | (December 28, 2005)
|
| notification provision in the terms of an
| |
| | Holding: An employer is not entitled to
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| auto insurance policy. Justice Baer filed
| |
| | Supersedeas Fund reimbursement for
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| a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
| |
| | compensation and medical bills paid while
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| Castille, in which he characterized the
| |
| | a Petition for Forfeiture is pending
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| provision at issue as a "technical escape
| |
| | because the petition for forfeiture was
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| hatch by which to deny coverage in the
| |
| | pursuant to § 306(f.1)(8), and not §
|
| absence of prejudice." Justice Nigro did
| |
| | 413 or § 430 of the Act. Justice Newman
|
| not participate in the decision of the
| |
| | filed a dissenting opinion, in which
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| case.
| |
| | Justices Castille and Baer joined.
|
| 1.2. CIVIL PROCEDURE
| |
| | 1.4. NEW RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
|
| ► Service of Process
| |
| | ►Disclosure of Legal Malpractice
|
| ♦ McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia
| |
| | Insurance Coverage
|
| No. 31 EAP 2005 (December 28, 2005)
| |
| | ♦ Rule of Professional Conduct
|
| Holding: After an action has been
| |
| | 1.4(c)
|
| commenced, a plaintiff must provide
| |
| | Effective July 1, 2006, lawyers in
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| notice of the action to the defendant in
| |
| | private practice are required to notify
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| order for the purpose of the statute of
| |
| | their clients if they do not have
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| limitation to be fulfilled. A complaint
| |
| | professional liability insurance of at
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| should, therefore, only be dismissed in
| |
| | least $100,000 per occurrence and
|
| those cases in which the plaintiff has
| |
| | $300,000 in the aggregate per year,
|
| demonstrated an intent to stall the
| |
| | subject to commercially reasonable
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| judicial machinery or when plaintiff's
| |
| | deductibles. The Rule also specifies the
|
| failure to comply with the Rules of Civil
| |
| | language of the required disclosures, and
|
| Procedure has prejudiced the defendant.
| |
| | mandates that attorneys maintain a record
|
| Justice Newman filed a dissenting
| |
| | of the disclosures for six years after
|
| opinion. Justice Eakin also filed a
| |
| | termination of the representation of a
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| dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
| |
| | client.
|
| Nigro.
| |
| | ►Consumer Credit Transactions
|
| The Supreme Court has yet again revisited
| |
| | ♦ New Rules of Civil Procedure 1326
|
| its decision in Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d
| |
| | to 1331
|
| 882 (Pa. 1976). In McCreesh, the Court
| |
| | Effective February 1, 2006, the Court has
|
| now holds that a plaintiff need not
| |
| | promulgated Rules of Civil Procedure
|
| strictly comply with the Rules by
| |
| | governing proceedings to compel
|
| repeatedly reissuing a writ of summons;
| |
| | arbitration and to confirm an arbitration
|
| instead, the Court looks to the good
| |
| | award in a claim arising from a consumer
|
| faith efforts of a plaintiff to
| |
| | credit transaction.
|
| effectuate service, including considering
| |
| | 2. SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
|
| whether a defendant has actual notice of
| |
| | 2.1. ►Defamation - Conditional
|
| the litigation and is not prejudiced by
| |
| | Privilege
|
| the lack of strict compliance with the
| |
| | ♦ Moore v. Cobb-Nettleton
|
| Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts here
| |
| | 2005 PA Super 426 (December 21, 2005)
|
| - in which plaintiff attempted to serve
| |
| | Holding: A social worker, who makes
|
| the writ by certified mail in clear
| |
| | professional disclosures required by
|
| violation of the Rules - are certain to
| |
| | Pennsylvania law, is entitled to a
|
| generate further litigation. The true
| |
| | conditional privilege in a defamation
|
| food for thought - and further litigation
| |
| | lawsuit.
|
| - appears in Justice Eakin's dissent, in
| |
| | 2.2. ►Learned Intermediary Doctrine
|
| which he states:
| |
| | ♦ Lineberger v. Wyeth
|
| The "majority has developed a new rule
| |
| | 2005 Westlaw 3547682 (Pa. Super.,
|
| holding a trial court may only dismiss a
| |
| | December 21, 2005) Holding: In a
|
| case where there is ineffective service
| |
| | pharmaceutical failure to warn case, the
|
| in two distinct situations: (1) where the
| |
| | plaintiff must establish both a duty to
|
| plaintiff's actions evidence an intent to
| |
| | warn and a failure to warn. The plaintiff
|
| stall the judicial machinery, or (2)
| |
| | must also show that, had the defendant
|
| where the plaintiff's failure to comply
| |
| | issued a proper warning to the physician
|
| with the Rules of Civil Procedure has
| |
| | (the learned intermediary), the learned
|
| actually prejudiced the defendant. . .
| |
| | intermediary would have altered his or
|
| .The majority goes so far as to suggest
| |
| | her behavior, i.e., would not have
|
| that without prejudice, actual notice
| |
| | prescribed the drug, and the injury would
|
| itself, much less proper service, may be
| |
| | have been avoided.
|
| unnecessary."
| |
| | This is an unpublished opinion, although
|
| 1.3. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
| |
| | counsel for Wyeth has stated that he will
|
| ►Impairment Rating Evaluations
| |
| | request that the Court publish the
|
| (IREs)
| |
| | opinion.
|
| ♦ Gardner v. Workers' Compensation
| |
| | 3. COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
|
| Appeal Board No. 14 EAP 2004 (December
| |
| | 3.1. ►Workers' Compensation -
|
| 28, 2005)
| |
| | Hepatitis C
|
| Holding: An employer/workers'
| |
| | ♦ City of Philadelphia v. Workers'
|
| compensation carrier must request that a
| |
| | Compensation Appeal Board (Sites) No.
|
| workers' compensation claimant submit to
| |
| | 1410 C.D. 2005 (December 21, 2005)
|
| an Impairment Rating Evaluation within
| |
| | Holding: Hepatitis C may be deemed an
|
| sixty (60) days from the date that the
| |
| | occupational disease even if the
|
| claimant receives, or comes into
| |
| | condition was not specifically identified
|
| possession of 104 weeks of total
| |
| | as an occupational disease until after
|
| disability benefits in order to obtain
| |
| | the claimant's diagnosis.
|
| the automatic relief under 77 P.S. §
| |
| | 3.2. ►Workers' Compensation -
|
| 511.2(2). If an employer fails to request
| |
| | Suspension/Bad Faith
|
| an IRE within this time period, it may
| |
| | ♦ Virgo v. Workers' Compensation
|
| still request an IRE at a later date
| |
| | Appeal Board (County of
|
| pursuant to 77 P.S. § 511.2(6), but must
| |
| | Lehigh-Cedarbrook) No. 1167 C.D. 2005
|
| utilize the traditional administrative
| |
| | (December 22, 2005)
|
| process in order to modify a claimant's
| |
| | Holding: An employer is entitled to a
|
| disability status. Justice Nigro filed a
| |
| | suspension of benefits when an employee
|
| concurring opinion, and Justice Newman
| |
| | is discharged from employment because of
|
| filed a dissenting opinion.
| |
| | "bad faith" in carrying out her job
|
| Workers' compensation practitioners who
| |
| | responsibilities. This is a classic
|
| had been awaiting the decision in Gardner
| |
| | example of bad facts making bad law (at
|
| now know that an employer/insurer can
| |
| | least for workers' compensation
|
| request an IRE up to two times within any
| |
| | claimants). One of the most common
|
| twelve-month period. The only limitation
| |
| | questions raised by injured workers is
|
| on an employer's right to an IRE is that
| |
| | what happens if they return to work at
|
| the employer cannot avail itself of the
| |
| | light duty and are then fired because of
|
| automatic relief under the Act if the
| |
| | allegedly unsatisfactory job performance.
|
| exam is not requested within 60 days of
| |
| | This case answers the questions, holding
|
| the employee's receipt of 104 weeks of
| |
| | that workers' compensation benefits may
|
| benefits. In reality, this means that a
| |
| | be suspended under those circumstances.
|
| workers' compensation carrier is now able
| |
| | Of course, in this case, the employee did
|
| to reduce virtually every claimant to
| |
| | not have a "clean" record, and it was
|
| partial disability status at any time
| |
| | easy for the Court to uphold the
|
| after the claimant has received two years
| |
| | suspension. What happens, however, when
|
| of benefits. Although a claimant can try
| |
| | the unsatisfactory performance occurs
|
| to defend against a modification petition
| |
| | only after the employee is at light duty
|
| based upon an IRE, the fact that
| |
| | and, as employees frequently claim, their
|
| literally no claimant can meet the
| |
| | firing is a pretext because the employer
|
| statute's requirement that he or she have
| |
| | only wants them to work at full duty?
|
| a 50 percent impairment means that any
| |
| | Time will tell.
|
| defenses will, at best, delay the
| |
| | SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE
|
| inevitable.
| |
| | DIVISION OPINION
|
| ►Physical Versus Mental Injuries
| |
| | ► Doe v. XYC Corp.
|
| ♦ Panyko v. Workers' Compensation
| |
| | No. A-2909-04T2 (December 27, 2005)
|
| Appeal Board No. 37 WAP 2004 (December
| |
| | Holding: An employer on notice that one
|
| 28, 2005)
| |
| | of its employees is using a workplace
|
| Holding: A claimant who suffers a purely
| |
| | computer to access pornography, possibly
|
| physical injury, such as a heart attack,
| |
| | child pornography, has a duty to
|
| because of a psychic reaction to a
| |
| | investigate the employee's activities and
|
| working condition, is not required to
| |
| | to take prompt and effective action to
|
| establish that the working condition was
| |
| | stop the unauthorized activity, lest it
|
| abnormal. Thus, claimants allegedly
| |
| | result in harm to innocent third parties.
|
| suffering from physical injuries are not
| |
| | No privacy interest of the employee
|
| required to show that their injuries are
| |
| | stands in the way of the duty on the part
|
| the result of abnormal working
| |
| | of the employer.
|
| conditions. Rather, they need only show
| |
| |
|
